This paper develops a two-country monetary DSGE model in which households choose a portfolio of home and foreign equities, and a forward position in foreign exchange. Some goods prices are set without full information of the state. We show that temporarily sticky nominal goods prices can have large effects on equity portfolios. Home and foreign portfolios are not identical in equilibrium. In response to technology shocks, sticky prices generate a negative correlation between labor income and the profits of domestic firms, biasing portfolios in favor of home equities. In contrast, under flexible prices, labor income and the profits of the domestic firms are positively correlated. Even a small amount of nominal price stickiness can generate these portfolio differences, depending on the diversification role played by the terms of trade. Returns on human capital and equities may be positively correlated under sticky prices when the source of shocks is monetary, but this risk is hedged through nominal assets rather than through equities.
Introduction
In an open macroeconomy in which asset trade is possible, the portfolio choice of households may play an important role in understanding macro fluctuations. In contrast to a closed economy model -in which a representative agent simply holds the market portfolio -agents in each country may hold different portfolios depending on the country-specific risks and returns that they encounter.
Portfolio choice might matter for a number of questions: Does the international transmission mechanism depend on who owns firms? Do changes in valuations of internationally traded assets play a role in the macroeconomic adjustment to shocks? Is there an interaction between the stock market and exchange rates? 1 There is a long history in international finance of "portfolio balance" models of the open economy that integrate portfolio choice into an open-economy general equilibrium. Black (1973) , Branson (1977) , and Branson and Henderson (1985) are prominent early efforts. The earlier papers integrate asset choice into general equilibrium macro models by taking some ad hoc shortcuts. But, for example, Lucas (1982) provides a fully optimizing model of portfolio balance, in which households trade bonds, equities, and claims to monetary transfer from the government. Lucas (1982) and all subsequent fully-worked out portfolio-balance models have complete nominal goods price flexibility. However, the earlier tradition focused on sticky-price models, which might be appropriate for the consideration of the real consequences of nominal exchange rate fluctuations. There have been some attempts to incorporate optimizing portfolio choice into sticky-price macro models, 2 but none of these attempts successfully nest dynamic portfolio choice in a fully-optimizing model with agents maximizing subject to explicit dynamic budget constraints and with an explicit definition of equilibrium. These models are still considered valuable tools for analyzing open economies (recent examples include Blanchard, Giavazzi, and Sa (2005) and Edwards (2005) ), 3 but they lack a rigorous foundation. As Obstfeld (2004, p. 557) notes, "we have no integrative general-equilibrium monetary model of international portfolio choice, although we need one." This paper fills the gap.
But what do we learn by modeling portfolio choice in a sticky-price environment? Indeed, it would seem at first blush that price stickiness should be a minor consideration for asset demands. The value of an asset is determined by the expected present discounted value of its current and future payouts. Since persistent productivity shocks drive the real payoffs of assets, price stickiness should have only a small effect on the expected present value. One of the central insights of this paper is that transitory price stickiness can have a large impact on international asset choice. It draws on the insight that terms-of-trade changes can provide substantial insurance for productivity shocks even in
The second major insight of the paper is that it is not the unconditional correlation between domestic equity returns and human capital that is important. What matters is the correlation conditional on the source of the shock. In our model, the unconditional correlation between the return to human capital and the return to domestic equities (relative to foreign equities) could be positive.
But home bias arises because that correlation is negative if the source of shocks is productivity.
The intuition is straightforward: If all nominal prices are sticky, in the short run the level of output is demand determined. Productivity shocks have no effect on short-run output if the firm adjusts output only in response to changes in demand. For example, if home firms experience a positive productivity shock, their demand for labor will decline. Employment and wages will fall, but profits to the firm will increase. An effective hedge against employment and wage risk is ownership of the firm. If output is demand determined, the short-run returns to labor and firm owners are negatively correlated, in contrast to the usual presumption in neoclassical models.
The fact that productivity shocks create a negative correlation between returns to workers and those to firm owners is a key implication of the model. Gali (1999) builds a closed economy model under sticky prices and shows that it can generate a fall in labor hours in response to the positive technology shock, which rarely arises in a flexible price model. 9 His empirical work demonstrates that labor hours decline in response to positive technology shocks in most G7 countries.
In our model, both monetary shock and technology shocks lead to consumption risk, but monetary shocks can be hedged effectively with bond portfolios (or by taking a forward position in foreign exchange.) Unexpected changes in the relative supplies of money (at home and abroad) create nominal exchange rate changes that in turn alter the value of returns on home and foreign bonds.
Monetary shocks lead to positively correlated changes in labor payments and profits, but that risk is not hedged with the equity portfolio. The unconditional correlation of returns to human capital and domestic equities relative to foreign equities may be positive or negative, depending on the relative importance of monetary or productivity shocks, but there could still be considerable home bias. This occurs in our model because of features that are not present in previous equilibrium models of international portfolio diversification. Our model has two independent sources of shocks, and a nontraded asset. Moreover, because of the role of sticky nominal goods prices, the productivity shock and the monetary shock produce opposite correlations of returns to human capital and returns to domestic equities relative to foreign equities.
Of course, nominal prices do not remain fixed forever when productivity or monetary shocks occur. Eventually an adjustment is made and neoclassical results obtain in the long run. Indeed, our model has real labor income positively correlated with productivity shocks in the long run. The degree of home bias depends on the persistence of price stickiness, the persistence of productivity shocks, and the weight that households assign to future consumption. We show that home bias is greater when prices adjust more slowly, when productivity shocks (in one country relative to the other) are less persistent, and when the future is discounted more heavily. However, we emphasize that the degree of home bias also depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods.
When that elasticity of substitution is near unity, the terms of trade provide nearly complete insurance for productivity shocks in the long run. In that case, the welfare gains of insuring against short-run employment risk due to price stickiness dominate long-run considerations.
Our chief aim is to provide a general equilibrium model of portfolio choice under sticky nominal prices in the open economy, not necessarily a model of home bias in equities. The literature has taken many different approaches to explain home bias. In addition to the papers cited above that consider diversification against non-tradable risks, several other avenues have been explored. One group of studies has argued that the gains from international diversification are in fact small, so that small transactions costs of diversification will lead to heavily concentrated portfolios. 10 Others have claimed that acquisition of information about foreign firms is more costly than for information on home firms.
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Another set of studies shows that home bias can be explained in the context of generalized preferences or prior beliefs. 12 Some claim that home bias is partly due to empirical mismeasurement. 13 All of these factors may help explain home bias.
In the following sections, we present two kinds of models. The first is static. It is much easier to understand the economic forces at work in the relatively simple static model, but the intuition we arrive at here carries over to the second model which is a more realistic dynamic one. The reason the intuition carries over is that we find in the dynamic model that our asset portfolio replicates the risk sharing that would occur if a complete set of contingent claims were traded, so that investors' wealth remains constant over time.
The Simple Static Model
We build a general-equilibrium, two-country model with sticky prices. We call the countries Home and Foreign. The world population is normalized to unity; half the population lives in Home and half in Foreign. Their preferences are identical. Households provide labor and own firms through equity. Firms use labor as the only input to produce a good monopolistically, and preset their prices in 10 For example, Cole and Obstfeld (1991) , Tesar (1995) , Butler and Joaquin (2002) and many others. However, van Wincoop (1994 , for example, finds large unexploited gains from international risk sharing. 11 For example, Kang and Stulz (1997) and Hasan and Simaan (2000) . A related recent study is van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2005) . 12 For example, van Wincoop (1994) , Aizenman (1999) as examples of the former and Pastor (2000) for the latter. 13 For example, Rowland and Tesar (2004) find that multinationals may have provided diversification opportunities for some countries.
the consumers' currency. Markets are segmented so that only firms can export goods. All goods are tradable and perishable. In this section, the model is static.
We adopt local currency pricing here. We observe in the data, at least for developed countries, that consumer prices are sticky in the consumers' currencies rather than in the producers' currencies.
However, the pricing assumption is not particularly important in determining the equity portfolio. In fact, we would have exactly the same equity portfolio when prices are preset in producers' currencies, even though the equilibrium number of forward contracts differs. 14 In our model, we consider two kinds of shocks: monetary and technology shocks. The distribution of shocks is identical between Home and Foreign.
Finally, we assume that before the realization of shocks, only forward contracts in the foreign exchange and equities are traded.
Households
Households in both countries have identical preferences over the consumption basket, the real money of the domestic country, and leisure. There are two stages to the household decision problem.
In the first stage, households choose a portfolio position: shares of Home equities ( h γ ), shares of Foreign equities ( f γ ), and a forward position in foreign exchange ( δ ). These are chosen before the resolution of uncertainty. After shocks are realized, households choose consumption, labor supply and money balances to maximize 1 1 , , ln 1 1 
where 0 ω > is the elasticity of substitution between Home produced goods and Foreign produced goods. is the consumption basket of Home produced goods and
C is that of Foreign produced goods:
4)
where λ denotes the elasticity of substitution among varieties, with 1 λ > . Then we can write the CPI as follows: Prior to the realization of shocks, the households choose the portfolio position to maximize expected utility ( 1 , ,
16 subject to the constraint:
Note that there is no constraint on the forward position, δ . We assume that the ex ante distribution of shocks are identical between Home and Foreign. This assumption, together with the assumptions of identical size and identical preferences, gives us an equilibrium in which the equity prices of Home and Foreign firms are the same prior to the realization of shocks.
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In our normalization, the representative household of each country is endowed with an ownership share of 1 of their own firms, 15 Theoretically, profits can be negative in the case of a loss, but we have to assume that the profits of both Home firms and Foreign firms are positive to take logarithms. 16 We use the notation that expectations are taken at time t-1 in this section -even though the model is staticfor notational convenience so that we can refer to some of the same equations that arise in the dynamic model. 17 If prices are different, then one country is richer than the other ex ante, a situation that contradicts symmetry.
but they may trade some of their shares with households in the other country, which implies constraint (2.7). Given the symmetry in the model, there is home bias when 1 2 f γ < .
Given prices and the total consumption basket, , the optimal consumption allocations are
The remaining first order conditions are
Firms
Firms engage in monopolistic competition as in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) . A firm in this economy monopolistically produces a specific good indexed by using a linear technology: 
Similarly, the optimal price of Home goods for the Foreign market is ( )
Because firms are all alike, they will set the identical prices for each market.
The market clearing condition can be obtained by equating the output with the sum of the demands for Home goods: 
Firms will pay out all of their profits as dividends.
We assume that t A and * t A are drawn from identical lognormal distributions with ( 
The labor market is competitive, and the wage moves freely to equate demand and supply of labor after the shocks. The output of each good is determined by demand. Firms adjust output after the shocks to satisfy demand, holding prices constant. The money market is assumed to equilibrate, so money demand equals money supply.
Solution of the Static Model
An equilibrium in the static model satisfies equations (2.2) and (2.5)-(2.21), and their foreign counterparts. These 39 equations (one is redundant by Walras' Law) solve for , , Our focus is on the equilibrium portfolio choice of equity shares and forward foreign exchange position. We proceed in this section to construct the equilibrium solutions for these variables in an intuitive manner. We will first derive the portfolio demands for households, taking prices as given. With these in hand, we will use equilibrium conditions in goods, labor, and asset markets to derive the equilibrium portfolio positions.
We rely on ex ante symmetry in the derivations below. Lower-case letters refer to logs of their upper case counterparts. We use "var" to denote variance, and "cov" covariance. 21 We use the
In the linearized equations below, we suppress the intercept terms for convenience.
Under log-normality, the household first-order condition (2.12) can be written as 1 cov ( , ) var( ) 0 2 t t t c s s That term tells us that the share of Foreign equities will be larger the greater the covariance between wage income and Home profits relative to Foreign profits. If this covariance is positive, there will be anti-home bias ( 1 2 γ > ), as in Baxter and Jermann (1997) . In that case, returns to Home equities (compared to returns on Foreign equities) are positively correlated with labor income, so the variance of total income (returns to equities and human capital) is reduced by holding a relatively large share of Foreign equities. There is home bias when that covariance is negative. In that case,
Home equities serve as a hedge against labor income shocks.
So far, to arrive at equation (2.25), we have only used the households' first-order conditions and budget constraints, along with the symmetry assumption and the assumption that nominal prices are fixed. Now we can bring in one more equation from the rest of the economy, the linearization of the profit equation for Home firms. We have from (2.20) 
where we have used symmetry to infer that
using symmetry to infer that cov( , ) 0 We can then get the equilibrium value of δ , when 0
We find complete home bias in equity holdings, 0 γ = . Equation (2.25) indicates that the share of equities held in the foreign firm is determined by the covariance of the component of Home 
Using the definition of world consumption, this expression can be written as
This condition indicates that the linearized model replicates the equilibrium in which a full set of nominal contingent bonds is traded. As is well known, in this case (and assuming symmetry), the marginal utility of a unit of Home (or Foreign) currency is equalized between home and foreign residents:
Equation (2.28) takes the log of this condition, using symmetry to infer nction. Other specifications that maintain equations (2.12) and (2.13) will deliver n as trading a full set of nominal contingent claims in the linearized economy.
23
We have derived the complete home bias result using only the nominal price stickiness assumption, the definition of Home profits, the budget constraint of Home households, and the two first-order conditions (2.12 and 2.13) that pertain to asset choice. (The derivations in this subsection all arise from equations (2.22), (2.23), (2.24), and (2.26), which are the approximated versions of the two first-order conditions for asset choice, the household budget constraint, and the def
In performing the approximations, we have used the fact that prices are preset.)
We have not relied on other features of the model, so our home bias result is robust to alternative assumptions. For example, the result does not depend on money demand arising from real balances in the utility fu the same result.
As long as symmetry is maintained, the result does not depend on the assumptions about monetary policy. In particular, we emphasize that our result does not depend on any assumption about the correlation of money shocks and productivity shocks. The reason is that forward contracts fully hedge monetary policy innovations, regardless of their correlation with innovations to technology. That is because, as we show below, the exchange rate is determined by relative money supplies om falling wages, or reduced hours, o dings of money balances (and again using the fact that nominal prices are preset), is written as .
The result also does not depend on our specification of the labor market as competitive with flexible wages. For example, a sticky-wage model in which employment was demand determined
would not alter the conditions that we used in the derivation of the home-bias result. The key point is that when nominal prices are set in advance, revenue earned by the firm does not depend on the realization of productivity. The quantity produced by the firm is determined by demand, and the price is set in advance, so price times quantity does not respond to technology shocks. Full hedging of technology shocks would then require households to hold only the domestic equity. Any decline in employment income arising from productivity changes -whether it be fr r some combination -is completely offset in profits to the firm.
Further insights can be obtained from making use of some of the other equations of the model.
Specifically, the first-order condition for hol The fact that equity demand depends only on the covariances after projecting on the exchange rate means that the equity portfolio is used only to hedge productivity shocks. Productivity shocks do not influence the amount of product the firm sells, which is demand determined in a stickyprice model. Nor do productivity shocks affect the exchange rate, which influences firm revenue as well. So firm revenue depends only on monetary shocks. A positive productivity shock, for example, allows the firm to produce the quantity demanded with less labor. Both wages and employment fall in equilibrium. Profits increase by the exact amount of the drop in labor income. But the effect of those n household income is fully hedged when Home households hold 100 percent of Home firms.
Monetary shocks have real consequences in this model. Indeed, equation (2.29) shows that in equilibrium, consumption is determined only by money supplies. As we have noted, productivity shocks only affect the distribution of revenues between labor income and profits, but in equilibrium, the effects of that redistribution is nullified by the complete home bias in equity holdin of monetary shocks are hedged through the forward position in foreign exchange. In this section, we build an infinite-horizon model, which allows us to examine the effects of persistent technology shocks in the static model.
The price-setting rule is modified as follows. A fraction τ of firms in each country set prices in advance, and the rest of the firms can adjust their prices in each period after the realization of shocks. This approach allows us to study the portfolio allocation with or without sticky prices, and we can learn how different degrees of price stickiness affect the portfolio. There are different types of firms in each country but we assume the equities of all firms in each country are bundled together.
We address two important questions here. First, does price stickiness matter much for international portfolio choice? In a world with temporary price stickiness and persistent productivity shocks, one might expect the answer is no. But we will show that in fact a small amount of price stickiness may matter a lot. Second, how do persistent shocks affect the optimal portfolio? In a flexible price setting, the optimal portfolio is more foreign skewed than it is in the classic endowment economy case, as shown in Baxter and rmann (1997 Our assumptions on consumption, asset acquisition, etc., follow exactly the standard presentation of the non-stochastic dynamic model (see, for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) ), with one exception: We assume, as in the static model, that households can take a forward position in foreign exchange. Making a contract to buy foreign exchange forward next period, of course, is equivalent to buying a nominal (non-state-contingent) bond denominated in the foreign currency and shorting a nominal bond denominated in the home currency. We could have introduced nominal bonds denominated in each currency separately into the model, rather than forward contracts.
However, that would add nothing to our presentation. We shall see below that the (linearized) model with equities and forward contracts reproduces the allocation that would be achieved with trade in a complete set of nominal state-contingent bonds. So, if we introduced non-state-contingent nominal bonds i sition held by each household will exactly reproduce their position in the forward market.
The first order conditions for the households are nstead of forward contracts, we know that the po
2) These are, respectively, financial wealth, human capital, the rate of return on financial wealth and human r r algebraic convenience) and the share of foreign equity in equity portfolio.
We can rewrite the budget constraint (3.1) for time capital (each multiplied by the utility discount facto fo 
The first order conditions for equity holdings, (3.5) and (3.6),
can be summarized as
irms in each country. A fraction
Firms
Firms use the same linear technology as in the previous section. We have two types of f τ of firms set the price in advance, and the rest set the price after the realization of shocks. The profit maximization problem of the Home firm with price flexibility is
is not a function of , and is not a function of , the problem is easy to solve: is the optimal price for the Foreign market.
The other optimal prices are , 1 , 18) where D is the stochastic discount factor, and is the optimal price for the Home market at time t of the goods produced by the firms that set prices in advance. Now we can rewrite the price indexes as follows:
, , preset h t
h t flex h t preset h t
Since we have CES sub-utility functions, the market clearing condition can be obtained by equating the output with the sum of the demands for Home goods:
While flexible-price firms will have higher profit than preset-price firms in general, CES subutility makes the aggregate profit of each country the same as before: 
(3.23)
We assume that any assumptions about the correlation of monetary shocks and productivity shocks. As long as there is some independent component to the money shocks -that is, as long as the correlation between money and productivity shocks lies on the interval [0,1) -our results go through.
Solution of the Dynamic Model

Stationarity of solution
To solve the model, we use approximations similar to those in the static model. The Appendix presents the solution to the model. There, the equilibrium is defined and solutions for all the endogenous variables are given. It shows that the equilibrium conditions are satisfied for those solutions. The derivation of the solution is extremely algebra intensive. Here we discuss the salient features of the solution.
An important feature of the solution is that we are able to replicate the allocation achieved when a full set of state-contingent nominal bonds are traded in the linearly approximated model. We have two kinds of assets (equities and forward currency contracts) that span the space generated by Why then is relative total wealth equal? Suppose there is a positive relative technology shock, , but no change in world productivity so that Home productivity rises and Foreign productivity 0 R t a > falls. Hold monetary shocks equal to zero. In this case, we can show that neither Home nor Foreign consumption levels will be changed by the R t a shock in equilibrium, which is convenient for this example.
Period t wage income of Home workers falls when prices are sufficiently sticky, and period t wage income of Foreign workers rises, as in the static model. The period t profits of Home firms rise and period t profits of Foreign firms fall. The current income of Home relative to Foreign might rise or fall. On the one hand, Home's relative labor income falls, but the profits Home households reap may be greater than that of Foreign households when there is home bias in equity holdings.
Nonetheless, under the parameter configuration that delivers home bias, the overall income of Home falls relative to Foreign -the relative loss in wage income must outweigh any relative gain in profit income.
But, in this situation in which home bias arises, the relative decline in current income for Home is precisely offset by the gains Home gets in the value of its human wealth and the gain in the value of the equities that it carries into period t. 
Optimal portfolio
We show in the Appendix that t δ and t γ are constant over time and given by: Notice that the condition (3.31) does not depend on ρ or ζ , while ζ determines the level of home bias. There are intuitive explanations for how most of these parameters affect foreign equity demand.
As labor's share, ζ , rises, γ falls when there is home bias, and rises when there is antihome-bias. The intuition is straightforward given our discussion above: When the short-run effects that lead to a negative covariance of Home profits and labor income are sufficiently large that there is home bias, the home bias is amplified the larger is labor's share. The benefits from hedging labor income risk are greater when labor's share is greater. But when the long-run effects dominate, and returns to human capital are hedged by having a foreign-equity bias, the effect is again amplified the larger is labor's share. The values of home and foreign equities are determined by the expected present discounted value of current and future profits of the firms. Would we not expect that the long run effects of productivity growth on dividend growth and labor income growth wash out any temporary effects from price stickiness? Why would temporarily sticky prices matter so much?
The answer is that when goods prices adjust, terms of trade movements play an independent role in hedging consumption risk for households. When the home country, for example, has a negative productivity shock, its export price rises because the supply of its good has diminished. The increase in the relative price of its import tends to soften the blow from the negative productivity outcome. Indeed, as Cole and Obstfeld (1991) point out, when the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is unity ( 1 ω = ), the terms of trade movements provide complete consumption insurance without the need for any asset trade.
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The implication for portfolio choice is that the gains in households' utility from diversifying their equity portfolios are reduced by the terms-of-trade effect. So, while the optimal portfolio under flexible prices exhibits bias toward foreign equities, deviations from the optimal allocation may not impose much utility cost (and the cost goes to zero as ω goes to one.) But this insurance from terms of trade is not present when nominal prices are sticky. Productivity shocks cannot change pre-set goods prices, and the exchange rate is determined in equilibrium by monetary shocks. The equity portfolio must provide the hedge against productivity shocks when prices are sticky. As the elasticity of substitution, ω , approaches unity, this effect will dominate any gains from hedging longer run risks.
In our model, a fraction τ of the firms have set the price in advance for a single period. The response of the cash flow of those firms to a relative productivity shock, ˆR t a , is given by Ω , defined above.
In the period that a shock occurs, a fraction 1 τ − firms adjust their price freely. The impact of a relative productivity shock on their cash flow is given by (1 )( 1) (1 ) to the long-run effect, we get the total effect of a one-unit change in ˆR t a on the expected discounted cash-flow of firms that are adjusting their goods price to be Λ , defined above.
In these expressions, to be clear, the cash flow to sticky price firms refers to the one period during which the measure τ firms have set prices in advance. After the period in which the shocks occur, all firms are flexible-price firms. Nonetheless, the response of cash flow among sticky price firms can be much larger than the discounted sum of cash flow to flexible-price firms. For simplicity, if all firms were initially sticky price ( 1 τ = ), we see from these expressions that the impact of ˆR t a on the sticky-price firms' initial cash flow is given by (1 ) Formally, we can evaluate the effect of increasing price stickiness on the optimal portfolio, γ , starting from a situation in which all goods prices are flexible ( 0 τ = ). We find:
The limit of this derivative as ω approaches unity from above is negative infinity . More generally, if the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is not too different than one, a small amount of price stickiness can have a large effect on the portfolio. In the next section, we use values of the parameters of this model from calibrated general equilibrium models in the literature and find that the amount of home bias implied by the model is considerable.
Properties of the Model
We can calibrate the amount of home bias implied by the model. Although the model is not realistic enough to capture some features of the macroeconomy, it is still worthwhile to get a sense of the magnitude of home bias implied by the solution in equation (3.31). The share of the Home household's equity portfolio held in foreign shares, γ , depends on the price stickiness parameter, τ ; labor's share, ζ ; the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign aggregates, ω ; the discount factor, β ; the persistence of relative productivity shocks, R ϑ ; and, the elasticity of labor supply, ψ .
In most calibrations of new-Keynesian models with nominal price stickiness, the expected life of a nominal price (under Calvo price setting) is calibrated to be four quarters. 27 However, evidence produced by Bils and Klenow (2004) suggests that the average life of a price is closer to two quarters.
We will consider both calibrations. In our model, a measure τ of firms set prices for one period, and 26 This could increase the effect of relative productivity shocks on FL in the empirically implausible case that 1 ψ < and (2002) We follow Obstfeld and Rogoff (2002), and Bergin (2004) and set 1 ψ = .
With these parameters, we find 0.24 We now examine some other dimensions of our model. In our model, negative conditional correlation between labor hours and productivity conditioning on productivity shock is the key driving force for home bias. However, because households can hedge demand shock through forward contracts, the unconditional correlation can be positive. It is important to distinguish between conditional and unconditional correlation in our model. Gali (1999) has noted that real business cycle models tend to imply a positive correlation between hours and productivity. He shows in a simple closed-economy New Keynesian macroeconomic model that there is a negative correlation between hours and output per worker when there is a productivity shock. The reasoning is much the same as that in our model.
Gali goes on to derive empirical support for this implication of sticky-price models. He estimates a structural bivariate VAR on total labor hours and labor productivity using U.S. data.
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The model was estimated on quarterly data from 1948:I to 1994:IV. There are two types of shocks in the model, which Gali classifies as technology shocks and non-technology shocks. The nontechnology shocks can be associated with aggregate demand shocks. Under his identification scheme, only technology shocks can permanently increase labor productivity.
Gali finds that the conditional correlation between labor hours and productivity is negative for technology shocks, while the unconditional correlation is positive. Rotemberg (2003) finds similar results. If prices were flexible, in traditional real business cycle models, the correlation conditional on technology shocks would be positive -as it is in our model in the long run.
Gali's findings have not gone unchallenged. 29 Christiano, Eichenbum and Vigfusson (2003) substitute labor hours per capita for Gali's total labor hours and reverse Gali's finding on the conditional correlation. However, Francis and Ramey (2005a) use the same measure, but quadratically detrended, and find the negative correlation between hours per capita and productivity conditional on technology shocks. Gali, Lopez-Salido and Valles (2003) find a similar result, using first-differences in hours per capita. Francis and Ramey (2005b) create a new measure of hours per capita and confirm that a positive technology shock will reduce labor hours in the short run. While there is no consensus yet on the sign of the conditional correlation, there is some significant empirical support for the contention that it is negative.
Home bias does not require that the unconditional correlation of returns to human capital and returns to domestic equity be positive for two reasons: First, as we note above, productivity shocks may have a low variance relative to monetary shocks, but it is the covariance holding monetary shocks constant that matters for home bias. Second, it is the correlation of returns to human capital with the relative Home to Foreign equity returns that matters for productivity. If Home and Foreign productivity shocks are highly correlated, there may be home bias even when the conditional correlation of human capital returns and domestic equity returns is high. This is illustrated in Tables 2   and 3 . Here, we use the parameter values from our two experiments above in which the average life of a price was 4 quarters and 2 quarters. In addition, we set the coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ , equal to two, and we assume the world productivity shock is permanent, 1.0
28 He also uses employment instead of labor hours, and finds the same result holds for all G7 countries except Japan. 29 See Gali and Rabanal (2005) for details. Table 2 presents the correlation of returns on human capital with returns to domestic equities.
The correlation is calculated under alternative assumptions about the correlation of innovations to home and foreign productivity, and alternative assumptions about the standard deviation of productivity innovations relative to money supply innovations. There is a positive correlation of returns to human capital and Home equities in all cases. The correlations reported in this table (and   Table 3 ) are under the assumption that home and foreign monetary innovations are uncorrelated, but we find that the return correlations are virtually unchanged if we raise the money correlations to 0.5. Table 3 presents the correlation of returns on human capital with returns to domestic equities relative to foreign equities. Even here, we see that the correlations are positive unless the variance of productivity shocks is quite large relative to the variance of monetary shocks. What is a reasonable value for these relative variances? Gali and Rabanal (2004) provide one measure. They estimate a simple VAR using US data on hours and output in the non-farm sector. According to their measure, the ratio of the standard deviation of the home productivity shock to the home monetary shock is 1.12.
30
We see from table 3 that when the standard deviations of the two shocks are approximately equal, the model implies a positive correlation between the returns to human capital and the return to domestic equities relative to foreign equities. Table 4 reports some other correlations implied by the model. Table 4a refers to the case of average price duration of 4 quarters, and Table 4b to the case of 2-quarter duration. The top panel in each table reports the correlation of changes in logs of home and foreign consumption, the second panel is the correlation of changes in logs of home and foreign output, and the third is the correlation of changes in home consumption and output. These correlations are reported under various assumptions about the correlation of innovations in productivity shocks and the standard deviation of productivity shocks relative to monetary shocks (as in Tables 2 and 3) . Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe (1992) report for example that the correlation of US and European consumption is 0.46 and output is 0.70. They report a correlation of US consumption with US output of 0.76. (All of these are using Hodrick-Prescott detrending.) The numbers that we report in Table 4 are roughly in this range. For example in Table 4a , when we assume equal volatility of productivity and monetary innovations (as Gali and Rabanal find), and when home and foreign productivity innovations have a correlation of 0.75, then we find the correlation of home and foreign consumption growth is 0.39, the correlation of home and foreign output growth is 0.80, and the correlation of home consumption and output growth is 0.79. When prices are assumed to be sticky for a shorter period of time (Table 4b) , the corresponding correlations are 0.39 for home-foreign consumption growth, 0.72 for home-foreign output growth, and 0.78 for home consumption-output growth.
31 30 These variances are not reported in the paper, but were kindly provided to us by Pau Rabanal. 31 Note that in Backus, Kydland, and Kehoe, the reported correlation of shocks is closer to 0.25, rather than 0.75. All of the correlations are a bit lower in that case. However, we should not rely on BKK's estimate of this
In both the static and dynamic models, the allocation in the linearly approximated model replicates the one achieved when a full set of state-contingent bonds is traded. This is in a sense a shortcoming of our model since this allocation leaves other puzzles unsolved -the high volatility of the observed exchange rate or the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly as described in Chari et al. (2002) .
One possible way of extending our model may help to explain the anomalous behavior of real exchange rates and consumption, while maintaining our mechanism for home bias. Julliard (2004) argues, in a partial-equilibrium setting, that credit constraints (specifically, a constraint that prevents short selling of equities or bonds), may lead to substantial home bias when returns to human capital and relative equity returns are negatively correlated. His argument is that unconstrained households would prefer a portfolio weighted toward home equities for reasons similar to the ones discussed in this paper (though he takes as given the source of this negative correlation, rather than deriving it from a model.) Credit constrained households would like to go short in some assets. During the lifecycle of these households, they may move to a position in which they hold positive amounts of equities. Julliard demonstrates that these households that are just emerging from the credit constraint have a strong incentive to diversify their labor income risk, which they would do by acquiring a portfolio that is strongly biased toward domestic equities.
If such a model were to be embedded into a general equilibrium framework, the very tight link between the real exchange rate and relative consumption levels implied by our model would be broken. However, such a model would be very much more difficult to solve (even numerically) and it is unlikely that one could obtain a closed-form solution for the foreign equity share such as our equation (3.30).
Finally, our model implies that home bias arises because domestic equities provide a hedge for labor income. There is some evidence that bears out this source of home bias. Our evidence comes from the Survey of Consumer Finances 2001 public data, reported by the Federal Reserve
Board. In Table 5 we report the results of regressions of a household's equity share in their portfolio on the share of their income derived from labor income. To measure labor's share, we simply divide income reported from wages and salaries by the sum of income from all sources. We eliminate observations that do not lie between zero and one. Table 5 reports results for three different measures of the dependent variable. The first uses the value of foreign stocks directly held by households divided by the value of all stocks held by households. The second takes the value of foreign stocks divided by equity held by households (which is the sum of stocks, stock portfolio mutual funds and 50% of mixed portfolio mutual funds held by households.) The third takes the value of stocks divided by the total financial wealth held by households. In all cases, we report a negative coefficient on correlation because it comes from a model in which output is driven only from technology shocks. Further empirical investigation of our model is required.
labor income, as our model predicts: as labor income increases as a share of household income, home bias increases. In the second and third regression, the coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level.
Conclusion
Our model provides a general equilibrium analysis of the factors that determine equilibrium portfolio choice in a dynamic setting. Sticky-price portfolio balance models have been a staple of open-economy macroeconomics for decades, but until now there was no fully integrated dynamic stochastic equilibrium model. Our model is, we believe, a starting point. We are able to solve the model in closed form, and therefore we can provide some novel insights into the interplay between financial markets and the macroeconomy.
We have stressed a few of these features. First, we have demonstrated that even a small amount of nominal rigidity -price setting with a relatively short duration -can dramatically alter equilibrium equity portfolios. Second, our model shows clearly how the different roles of monetary shocks and productivity shocks in determining equity portfolios and bond portfolios (or the position in the market for forward foreign exchange.) And, our model provides an interesting new mechanism that may help explain some of the home bias in equity portfolios.
Although our model provides a theoretical foundation for home bias, we believe other factors, such as information costs, play important roles. The economic forces that lead to home bias in our model do not require the exclusion of other considerations that have been raised in the literature. We
have not built a model that is intended to explain home bias, because it does not include any features that are designed explicitly to deliver home bias. Instead, we have found that home bias is a natural outcome in a symmetric model in which output is demand determined to some extent and claims to labor income are not traded. The model can be solved analytically in a straightforward way, and extensions of this framework may prove useful in examining other questions in international finance, such as the role of valuation effects in external adjustment; the effects of portfolio adjustment on macroeconomic and current account adjustment, the relationship between movements in stock prices and exchange rates, etc. In some of the log-linearized equations below, the algebra is simplified considerably if we use the result that 0
(In our notation, x represents the unconditional mean of t x .) While we could proceed with the derivations without using this result, and then verify in the solutions that this result is true, it is easier to demonstrate this first and use it in some of the log-linearizations.
First, in the definition of profits for the home firm, divide both sides of equation (3.22) by , then evaluate the equation at the point of expansion for the log-linearziation:
32 There are 24 × 2+2 variables. 33 The number of equations should be 51, but one is redundant by Walras' Law. 35 We could easily accommodate unit-root processes in productivity. Then real variables expressed in "efficiency units" would be stationary. However, there is no real gain from this generalization, so we maintain stationary productivity shocks to simplify the algebra.
Here we have used symmetry to give us We log-linearize the budget constraint (3.13) to get 1 1
( .37) Notice that this allocation replicates the allocation when a full set of state-contingent bonds is 
A.4 Proof
We will show this allocation satisfies the equilibrium conditions.
A.4.1 Fundamental Variables
We now prove that the first order conditions for fundamental variables and labor market clearing conditions are in fact satisfied. 
A.4.2 Returns on assets
In order to show that this allocation in fact satisfies the first order conditions for asset holdings, we want to calculate the rate of return on assets -human capital and equities. Then subtracting the foreign counterpart of (A.50), we get (A.34), and adding the foreign counterpart gives us (A.35).
A.4.5 Budget Constraint
First, world budget constraint expressed in home currency is the following: This requires some explanation. The home currency earnings, expressed in home currency, from the forward market are . That means that the foreign currency earnings for the foreign country Finally, we examine relative budget constraint: We have verified that equations (A.1)-(A.6) and (A.14)-(A.17) are satisfied. Notes: Numbers on the left-hand-column refer to the correlation between innovations in home and foreign productivity, and . Numbers along the top row are the standard deviation of innovations in productivity relative to the standard deviation of innovations to the money supplies. The numbers reported in the tables are the correlation of home equity return with the return to home human capital. Notes: Numbers on the left-hand-column refer to the correlation between innovations in home and foreign productivity, and . Numbers along the top row are the standard deviation of innovations in productivity relative to the standard deviation of innovations to the money supplies. The numbers reported in the tables are the correlation of home relative to foreign equity return with the return to home human capital. Table 4a Correlations of Real Variables Average duration of 4 quarters correlation between home and foreign consumption growth Table 4b Correlations of Real Variables Average duration of 2 quarters correlation between home and foreign consumption growth 
